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REJOINDER

Crawford: Saxe as an Erosion of Individual Protections: A Response to Colit

Saxe as an Erosion of Individual Protections: A Response to Colitti
Jon G. Crawford, Ph.D., J.D.
Assistant Professor
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology, and Foundations
Northern Illinois University
jcrawford@niu.edu
Colitti asserts the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s decision in Saxe v. State College Area School District [1]
(2001) maligned a Pennsylvania public school board’s wellintended antiharassment policy, thereby denying “constitutional
protection to minority groups, especially gays.” Colitti’s analysis reflects a misguided understanding of the federal judiciary’s
duty to interpret and apply the U.S. Constitution and a myopic perspective of the Saxe opinion.
Over two centuries ago in Marbury v. Madison (1803) the Supreme Court declared “one of the fundamental principles of our
society” is that our Constitution is the “paramount law of the nation,” thereby rendering legislative acts that are repugnant to the
Constitution void.[2] When Saxe arrived before the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit the question was whether the school
board’s antiharassment policy, when considered in its totality, was repugnant to the U.S. Constitution, specifically the “First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech.”[3]
The District Court found the antiharassment policy did not violate the Constitution.[4] However, the appellate panel concluded
the District Court erred in identifying a “categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s speech clause.”[5]
Specifically, the appellate court believed the policy was written so expansively as to cover “simple acts of teasing and name
calling among school children.”[6] This was problematic because the First Amendment affords protection to “a wide variety of
speech that listeners may consider deeply offensive,”[7] including content or viewpointbased speech that demands “the most
exacting First Amendment scrutiny” before it may be prohibited.[8]
Collitti argues the Saxe opinion “flies in the face” of society’s demand for “safe and orderly schools.” Indeed, the Third Circuit
acknowledged school officials have a compelling interest in preventing discrimination in their schools.[9] However, this
compelling interest does not allow school leaders to adopt broad reaching antiharassment policies that collide with the U.S.
Constitution.[10]
The antiharassment policy’s fatal flaw was the fact that it extended coverage to harassment beyond that covered by federal
statues. For example, the policy addressed harassment based upon “a catchall category of ‘other personal characteristics’” such
as “clothing, appearance, hobbies and values, and social skills, none of which are protected under federal law.”[11] The court
noted a prohibition on “disparaging speech directed at a person’s values” would constitute a restriction on “moral and political
discourse … the core concern of the First Amendment.”[12] The appellate panel further noted the Supreme Court had previously
held “simple acts of teasing and namecalling” within the public school setting “were insufficient” to establish liability under a
harassment claim.[13]
As such, in order to pass muster under the Constitution the antiharassment policy needed to “be justified as a permissible
regulation of speech within the schools.”[14] At the time of the Saxe decision the Supreme Court had decided three cases, Tinker
v. Des Moines (1969),[15] Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986),[16] and Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988),[17]
which together provided school officials and lower courts the First Amendment’s limits for regulating inschool student speech.
Colitti chided the Third Circuit for conveniently ignoring Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942)[18] in deciding Saxe.
Curiously, he describes Chaplinsky as an “onpoint landmark case.” The fact that Chaplinsky announced that “fighting
words”[19] would fall under the narrow category of speech unprotected by the First Amendment may merit status as a landmark
case. However, Chaplinsky is not an “onpoint case.” Chaplinsky involved interpretation of a criminal statute and had nothing to
do with student speech within the public school setting. When Saxe was decided, the Supreme Court’s trilogy of school student
speech cases, Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood, were recognized as the “onpoint cases” to be used in judging the constitutionality
of student speech.
Tinker, often referred to as the “arm band case,” established the general rule that school officials could prohibit student speech
only if they could reasonably forecast the speech would “‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school” or collide with the rights of others.[20] Over seventeen years after Tinker,
Matthew Fraser, a high school senior, delivered a nomination speech during a school assembly for a fellow student who was
running for a student council office.[21] Throughout the speech, Fraser referred to the candidate using “an elaborate, graphic, and
explicit sexual metaphor.”[22] After delivering the speech Fraser was disciplined. Thereafter, the Supreme Court carved out an
exception to Tinker, holding that school officials could prohibit inschool student speech that was “lewd and indecent.”[23]
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Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier[24]was the only other case in existence at the time of the Saxe ruling in which the High
Court had examined the parameters for regulating student speech within the public schools. Here, students challenged a high
school principal’s decision to delete student articles on teen pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students from the school
sponsored newspaper. In upholding the principal’s decision the Court explained that school officials could “exercise editorial
control over the style and content of student speech in schoolsponsored expressive activities as long as [its] actions are
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.””[25]
When this studentspeech trilogy was applied to the antiharassment policy the Third Circuit concluded that the policy did “not
confine itself to merely vulgar or lewd speech,” thereby exceeding Fraser’s reach.”[26] Similarly, the policy covered “far more”
than schoolsponsored speech, thus exceeding Hazelwood’s safe harbor.[27] Finally, the policy failed to include an explanation
for why restrictions on student speech were “necessary to prevent substantial disruption or interference with the work of the
school or the rights of other students.”[28] This omission ignored Tinker’s “requirement that a school must reasonably believe that
speech will cause actual, material disruption before prohibiting it.”[29] These flaws led to the ineluctable conclusion that the anti
harassment policy was “substantially overbroad” and, as such, repugnant to the U.S. Constitution.[30]
The members of the State College Area School District Board of Education were elected to establish policies for the operation of
the local schools. The antiharassment policy was intended to effectuate the electorate’s goal of maintaining safe and orderly
schools. Therefore, Colitti concludes the Third Circuit’s ruling flew in the face of the will of the people. What if the “will of the
people” collides with the U.S. Constitution? Under Colitti’s reasoning, the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education (1954)
[31]
decision similarly flew in the face of the will of the people. The duly elected Topeka Board of Education adopted a policy
that allowed the operation of segregated elementary schools.[32] Should the Warren Court accorded “substantial weight” to the
statute adopted by the Kansas legislature that allowed local school officials to establish segregated schools? Hopefully, Colitti
would not place Brown in his same category as Saxe, i.e., an example of judicial activism resulting in the undermining of
democratic rights or an imperialistic encroachment on basic civil rights.
It is not suggested that Saxe merits the landmark status commonly accorded to the Brown decision. However, both decisions are
reflective of the federal judiciary’s proper role as the “impartial guardian of the law.”[33]
Colitti makes great moment of the fact that the antiharassment policy’s goal was to prevent discrimination. Indeed, the Third
Circuit noted that “preventing discrimination … in the schools … [was] … a compelling government interest.”[34] Nonetheless,
then Judge Alito noted, “we have found no categorical rule that divests ‘harassing’ speech, as defined by federal anti
discrimination statutes, of First Amendment protection.”[35] Even though the antiharassment policy’s goal, preventing
discrimination, was appropriate, the State College Area School District Board of Education simply cast their harassment net too
wide by including simple acts of teasing and namecalling within the ambit of the policy’s reach. As such, contrary to Colitti’s
assertions, Saxe was properly decided and reflected the proper application of the federal judiciary’s role within our democratic
system of government.
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See President Obama’s May 10, 2010, announcement of Solicitor General Elena Kagan as his nominee to the Supreme Court.
(“For nearly 35 years, Justice Stevens has stood as an impartial guardian of the law, faithfully applying the core values of our
founding to the cases and controversies of our time. He's done so with restraint and respect for precedent, understanding that a
judge's job is to interpret, not make, law, but also with fidelity to the constitutional ideal of equal justice for all.”).
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/news/ap/politics/2010/May/10/text_of_obama_s_remarks_on_the_nomination_of_kagan.html
last accessed May 11, 2010.
[33]

[34]

Saxe, 240 F. 3d at 209.

[35]

Id. at 210.
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